UNITED NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24050
31 May 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 1 December 1991 to 31 May 1992)

CONTENTS

		Paragraphs	Page
INTRODUCTION		1	2
I.	MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS	2 - 4	2
II.	RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES	5 - 7	4
III.	FUNCTIONS OF THE FORCE	8 - 34	4
	A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the status quo	8 - 20	4
	B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions	21 - 34	6
IV.	COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS	35 - 39	9
V.	FINANCIAL ASPECTS	40 - 42	10
VI.	GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL	43	11
VII.	FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS	44 - 56	11
VIII.	OBSERVATIONS	57 - 63	14
Map.	Deployment of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, May 1992		

92-22100 3914a (E) 020692 020692

/...

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 December 1991 to 31 May 1992 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Secretary-General's mission of good offices pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions concerning Cyprus. In its resolution 723 (1991) of 12 December 1991, the Security Council called upon all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with UNFICYP on the basis of the present mandate. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made (a report was submitted to the Council on 3 April 1992 1/) and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution by 31 May 1992.

I. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

2. The function of UNFICYP was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

> "In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

This mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in 1964, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 750 (1992). In connection with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council has adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire. 2/

3. The table below shows the establishment of UNFICYP as at 31 May 1992:

Military personnel

Austria	HQ UNFICYP	12	
	Infantry battalion, UNAB	388	
	Military police company	10	410
Canada	HQ UNFICYP	7	
	HQ CANCON	5	
	The Third Battalion, The Royal 22nd Regiment	538	
	Signal squadron	14	
	Military police company	11	575

Denmark	HQ UNFICYP	5	
	Infantry battalion, DANCON 57	323	
	Military police company	13	341
Finland	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military police company	3	7
Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Military police company	2	8
Sweden	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military police company	3	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	19	
	HQ BRITCON	6	
	Force scout car squadron, D squadron, 16th/5th Lancers	109	
	15th/19th The Kings Royal Hussars	339	
	UNFICYP support regiment	45	
	Engineer detachment	8	
	Signal squadron	53	
	Army aviation flight	18	
	Transport squadron	103	
	Medical centre	5	
	Ordnance detachment	11	
	Workshops	30	
	Military police company	9	755
			2 103

Civilian police

Australia	20	
Sweden	18	38
Total UNFICYP		2 141

4. Mr. Oscar Camilión continued as my Special Representative in Cyprus. On 8 April 1992, Major-General Clive Milner (Canada) handed over command of the Force to Major-General Michael F. Minehane (Ireland).

II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES

5. UNFICYP maintained close liaison and cooperation at all levels with the two sides in order to carry out its tasks effectively. The Force had freedom of movement in the southern part of the island, except for restricted military installations. Regarding movement in the north of the island, the guidelines established in 1983, 3/ and subsequently improved in practice, continued to be applied, with occasional difficulties experienced by UNFICYP. Efforts to increase UNFICYP's freedom of movement in the northern part of the island remained unsuccessful.

6. Once again, during the period under review, UNFICYP vehicles and personnel were stopped on a number of occasions by the military forces of both sides when approaching or entering the United Nations buffer zone. In addition, UNFICYP patrols continued to encounter interference when operating in areas of the buffer zone that are sensitive or not frequently patrolled. In some cases, UNFICYP's movement was restricted in these areas, and during the last six months there has been an increase in the number of incidents where weapons were pointed and cocked at UNFICYP personnel. UNFICYP continued to protest about these incidents to the authorities of both sides, reiterating its right to complete access to, and freedom of movement in, all parts of the buffer zone.

7. In addition, on a number of occasions UNFICYP was impeded by the Turkish Cypriot police element while conducting humanitarian tasks in support of Greek Cypriots in the north. Access to the Greek Cypriots living in the Karpas peninsula by UNFICYP humanitarian staff and civilian police was on several occasions denied and on three occasions UNFICYP staff were delayed and verbally abused by police officials. UNFICYP must rely on the steadfast cooperation of all parties and uninterrupted freedom of movement in carrying out its established and important humanitarian duties and responsibilities.

III. FUNCTIONS OF THE FORCE

A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the status quo

8. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to the east coast south of Famagusta in the area of Dherinia. The area between the lines is known as the United Nations buffer zone. Its width varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

9. UNFICYP keeps the United Nations buffer zone under constant surveillance through a system of 150 observation posts, 51 of which are permanently manned. Mobile and standing patrols are also employed, especially in sensitive areas. High-powered binoculars and night-vision devices are used to monitor the cease-fire lines on a continuous basis.

10. The UNFICYP patrol track runs the length of the United Nations Buffer Zone, and is essential to the ability of the force to monitor the cease-fire lines, supervise civilian activities in the buffer zone, re-supply observation posts and react promptly to incidents. British Engineers maintain this track in useable condition.

11. In November 1991, 4/ the Secretary-General reported that UNFICYP had agreed to permit the National Guard to clear mines from an area of the buffer zone on the understanding that the land would be designated for farming; and that, despite strong protests from UNFICYP the National Guard had subsequently relaid the minefield. The Secretary-General also reported that the Government of Cyprus had agreed to remove the mines in question. Despite these assurances, the mines have not been removed from the buffer zone. I understand that the Government's commitment in this regard will be fulfilled in the near future.

12. The number of cease-fire violations remained low and both sides continued to demonstrate considerable restraint and discipline in this respect. There were only three incidents in which shots were thought to have been fired deliberately. The military forces on both sides cooperated with UNFICYP's investigations and tension remained at a low level.

13. The 1989 agreement concerning the unmanning of certain positions in Nicosia continued to hold, with only a few minor violations by both sides. UNFICYP is continuing its efforts to extend the agreement to other areas in and adjacent to Nicosia, particularly where the troops of both sides remain in close proximity to each other. I strongly urge both sides to cooperate with these efforts.

14. During the period under review there was an increase in the number of air violations. There were 18 overflights of the United Nations buffer zone by Turkish Forces aircraft and 14 by National Guard aircraft. In addition, there were 44 overflights from the north and 19 from the south by civilian aircraft. Civilian or military aircraft of other countries accounted for a further 10 overflights. All these violations create tension and increase the risk of serious incidents.

15. The National Guard programme of construction on its defensive positions increased all along its cease-fire line and remained a contentious issue, which at times caused an increase in tension. The Turkish Forces continued to call for the work to be stopped. UNFICYP expressed reservations about some of the construction and complained about the National Guard's failure to advise UNFICYP beforehand of upcoming work. The National Guard often refused to cooperate in UNFICYP's investigations and was reluctant to allow inspections of its positions. The National Guard maintained that the works in question were in the area under its control and in no way violated the status quo.

16. There were no significant incidents in the fenced area of Varosha. However, UNFICYP's freedom of movement within the area continued to be restricted by the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces. As has been reported to

the Security Council before, the United Nations considers the Government of Turkey responsible for maintaining the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha. 5/ This position has been reiterated to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities on numerous occasions.

17. Six months ago, my predecessor reported 6/ that Greek Cypriot tourist and fishing boats violated the seaward extension of the cease-fire lines known as the maritime security line, established by UNFICYP as a practical measure for security and safety purposes 6/ in the vicinity of Kokkina and Famagusta. During the winter months, the number of violations decreased. However, in April and May 1992 the number of boats crossing the maritime security line has increased and on one occasion this led to warning shots being fired by Turkish forces at Greek Cypriot fishing boats. Such incidents raise tension and are potentially dangerous for the individuals concerned. It is, therefore, to be hoped that the responsible authorities will assist UNFICYP in supporting this practical and necessary measure. All concerned should warn fishermen, tourists and tourist companies of the danger involved and advise them of the location of the buffer zone and of its seaward extension.

18. Once again, unauthorized hunting by Greek Cypriots in the buffer zone caused UNFICYP safety and security concerns. Despite efforts undertaken by UNFICYP to implement practical arrangements with the Cyprus Government authorities to solve the problem, UNFICYP, with limited support from the Cyprus Police, was obliged to deal with some 119 individual violations and spent some 1,800 hours in policing this activity in a period of only 15 days. Safety and security concerns have prompted UNFICYP to foresee a ban on all future hunting in the buffer zone. All concerned will be expected to cooperate with the Force in this respect.

19. Each side again conveyed to me its concern about the strength of the military forces on the other side. For my own part, I remain very concerned about the strength and development of the military forces on both sides. This situation creates tension and carries the risk of serious incidents.

20. The Government of Cyprus complained again to the United Nations about the changing of place names and the distribution of land and title deeds to settlers and Turkish Cypriots in the northern part of the island. I have instructed UNFICYP to raise these matters with the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

21. As part of its efforts to promote a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP continued to facilitate civilian humanitarian activities in areas between and adjacent to the cease-fire lines. UNFICYP carries out these functions by shuttling between technical experts and other authorities on the two sides. This is a time-consuming process. It is desirable that the parties should set aside their reluctance and utilize UNFICYP's good offices to facilitate increased contacts between the two communities. I endorse UNFICYP's efforts

to sponsor bicommunal meetings and sincerely urge the authorities in both communities to support these efforts.

22. During this past winter, Cyprus had higher than average rainfall. As a result, reserves of water, both in-ground and in reservoirs, have seen a marked improvement. None the less, close and direct cooperation between the parties is required in order to ensure that the development, use and distribution of water resources on the island are judicious and fair. Of the many related issues, the careful and necessary management of the Morphou aquifer should receive immediate bicommunal attention.

23. The number of Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island is now 551, of whom 548 live in the Karpas peninsula and the remaining 3 in Kyrenia. UNFICYP continued to discharge humanitarian functions for these Greek Cypriots, delivering to them foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Government of Cyprus and the Cyprus Red Cross. Beginning in December 1991, the Turkish Cypriot authorities introduced a new policy whereby all such supplies that they considered not to be of a traditional humanitarian nature or which were not specifically approved by them would be subject to a customs levy. I urge the Turkish Cypriot authorities to adopt policies that facilitate unrestricted living conditions and standards for Greek Cypriots in the northern part of the island.

24. UNFICYP recently took an initiative that is aimed at returning to the relevant Red Cross representatives responsibility for the delivery of mail, medical supplies and Red Cross messages across cease-fire lines. I request full support for this initiative.

25. UNFICYP interviewed those Greek Cypriots who applied for "permanent transfer" to the southern part of the island in order to verify that the transfer was voluntary. Three such permanent transfers took place during the reporting period. UNFICYP also facilitated 298 visits by Greek Cypriots from the Karpas area to the southern part of the island. Despite strong efforts, UNFICYP has been unable to persuade the Turkish Cypriot authorities to loosen the present tight restrictions on the frequency and duration of temporary transfers to the south of Greek Cypriots living in the north.

26. UNFICYP continued its periodic visits to Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island and assisted in arranging family reunion visits for Turkish Cypriots at the Ledra Palace hotel. It was apparent that the Turkish Cypriot authorities gave preference to applications originating in the north. During the reporting period, of 58 applications processed from Turkish Cypriots living in the south, only 14 were approved. This matter was raised with senior officials in the north. Despite assurances received, there were no appreciable improvements in the practice. UNFICYP continued to distribute welfare/pension cheques to Turkish Cypriots living in the north who are former employees of the Government of Cyprus.

27. The number of Maronites living in the northern part of the island has continued to decline and is now 250. UNFICYP continued to assist in arranging contact between Maronites living on the island and to deliver to them foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government.

28. UNFICYP continued to provide emergency medical services, including medical evacuation of civilian members of both communities resident in the north. When the need arose, UNFICYP escorted Turkish Cypriots to hospitals in the south and regularly delivered medicines to members of the Turkish Cypriot community. Difficulties have arisen recently in both sides' approach to the transport of Turkish Cypriot patients to the south. I urge both sides to protect such vital humanitarian activities from political interference.

29. UNFICYP continued to facilitate relations between the communities in the mixed village of Pyla, located in the buffer zone. UNFICYP has actively assisted village mukhtars in exercising the full range of their responsibilities and has, on a strictly humanitarian basis, facilitated practical solutions to controversial issues. It has urged both sides to avoid any political manifestations or other activities that might jeopardize the generally good relations existing between the two communities in Pyla.

30. In March 1992, the Turkish Cypriot mukhtar requested UNFICYP's assistance in improving access to Turkish language radio/TV broadcasts through an increase in the height of an existing antenna and the replacement of equipment located at the Turkish Forces' post above Pyla. UNFICYP investigated all aspects of this proposal and, after receiving assurances from the mukhtar and from the Turkish Forces that the replacement equipment and the project as a whole would be used solely for stated civilian purposes, UNFICYP raised no objections to the modifications proposed. Accordingly the equipment was installed and will, by agreement, remain under UNFICYP surveillance.

31. The Cyprus police control point on the Larnaca-Pyla road, south of the buffer zone, continues to block the flow of tourists to the village of Pyla and has severely disrupted its economy. On a number of occasions, UNFICYP has requested that this obstacle be removed.

32. UNFICYP has continued to pursue exhaustive discussions with the parties in order to facilitate telephone communications between Turkish Cypriot residents of Pyla and the north.

33. In cooperation with UNFICYP and other United Nations agencies, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as coordinator of humanitarian assistance to Cyprus, continues to promote bicommunal projects aimed at giving Greek and Turkish Cypriots opportunities to work out a unified approach to areas of concern that affect the whole country. Bicommunal activities include seminars, workshops, research, training, consultation meetings, exchange visits, and sharing of expertise and equipment.

34. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as coordinator of the United Nations system's operational activities for development, continued its activities in the framework of the Nicosia Master Plan and pursued bicommunal projects with the various United Nations technical agencies active in Cyprus including the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nation (FAO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

35. During the period under review, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus held five sessions (fifty-seventh to sixty-first), consisting of 18 meetings, of which 12 were attended by the three members of the Committee and their assistants and 6 were attended solely by the three members.

36. The third member continued his efforts to obtain agreement from both sides that the totality of the cases of missing persons be submitted to the Committee. In doing so, the parties will help the Committee to assess with precision the problem of missing persons in Cyprus as a whole.

37. On 10 April 1992, the Committee issued a communiqué explaining some of the difficulties it faces, and the nature of the problems currently under discussion. In particular, the Committee made a public appeal to official bodies and to private persons to furnish the Committee with any information in their possession on missing persons, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Such information would be treated in the strictest confidence by the Committee. It also recalled that, according to the arrangements in force, no prosecution of any nature will ensue as a result of statements or information given to the Committee.

38. In December 1990, my predecessor wrote to President Vassiliou and to H.E. Mr. Denktaş pointing out that, even though it had been in existence for many years, the Committee had been given details on only about 15 per cent of the cases and urged both sides to submit to the Committee all its cases. Unfortunately, neither side has acceded thus far to the Secretary-General's request. In the same letter, the Secretary-General signalled that it would be important for the members of the Committee, in connection with the question of how to deal with the results of its investigations, to reach a consensus on criteria that both sides would be ready to apply in their respective investigations. He added that it would also be useful for the Committee to consider modalities for sharing with affected families any meaningful information that is available to the Committee on the cases of concern to them. It is regrettable that the intervening period has seen no progress on these issues.

39. I am persuaded that continued lack of progress on the above-mentioned issues would have the effect of indefinitely impairing the work of the Committee. Such a situation, were it to continue, would necessarily require a fundamental review of the Committee and its work.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

40. The cost to the United Nations of maintaining UNFICYP for a further period of six months beyond 15 June 1992, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force and assuming continuation of its existing strength and responsibilities, is estimated at $15.4 million, as detailed below:

UNFICYP cost estimate by major category of expense

(In thousands of United States dollars)

I. Operational costs incurred by the United Nations	
Movement of contingents	290
Operational expenses	1 722
Premises (maintenance, utilities, etc.)	742
Rations	965
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	3 231
Death and disability	100
Miscellaneous and contingencies	250
Total I	7 300
II. Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents	
Pay, allowances and transport	7 400
Contingent-owned equipment	700
Total II	8 100
Grand total (I and II)	15 400

41. The estimate does not reflect the full cost of the operation. It excludes, in particular, the regular costs that would be incurred by troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e., regular pay and allowances and normal expenses for matériel), as well as such extra costs as they have agreed to absorb.

42. That part of the financing of the cost of the Force which is borne by the Organization is dependent entirely on voluntary contributions from Governments. In this regard, only $4.4 million has been contributed by Member States, against anticipated expenditures of some $15.4 million for the mandate period that is about to end. As these contributions have never been sufficient to meet the cost of the Force, the reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries have been met only up to June 1981. Unless additional contributions are received, the accumulated deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account is expected to be approximately $192.7 million for the periods from the inception of the Force to the end of the current mandate period.

VI. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

43. In my report of 3 April 1992, 1/ I reported to the Security Council on my mission of good offices. On 10 April the Council adopted resolution 750 (1992). I have been requested to submit a full report to the Council on the outcome of my efforts by July 1992.

VII. FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

44. As indicated in paragraphs 30 to 33 of my report of 3 April 1992, 1/ the Security Council may soon have to decide on how to respond to the withdrawal or reduction of one or more of UNFICYP's main contingents, a move which would deny the Force the troops that have been judged necessary for it to execute its existing mandate. This problem arises in large part because UNFICYP is subjected to a uniquely unsatisfactory system of financing that distorts the normal criteria for judging whether a peace-keeping operation is required and, if so, with what mandate and how many personnel.

45. The future of UNFICYP may also, of course, be affected by the outcome of my present intensive efforts to complete the set of ideas referred to in paragraph 4 of resolution 750 (1992), on which I shall report to the Council by July 1992.

46. In November 1990, my predecessor appointed a team to review the organization and operations of UNFICYP. The review team's findings included the following:

(a) The functions of UNFICYP (maintenance of the status quo and prevention of a recurrence of fighting, and the promotion of a return to normal conditions) remain valid and necessary;

(b) Because of the absence of agreement between UNFICYP and the two sides, the maintenance of the status quo and the prevention of a recurrence of fighting are not self-sustaining. The visible presence of the Force and its deployment all along the buffer zone remain necessary to enable UNFICYP to be present where and when required;

(c) While the functions and tasks of UNFICYP and the conditions under which it has to operate are the same as in 1980, the number of permanently manned observation posts has been significantly reduced and has reached the minimum acceptable level. The number of on-line troops necessary to man the permanent and temporary observation posts, checkpoints, patrols, etc. could not be reduced any further without impairing the Force's ability to carry out the necessary functions arising from its mandate.

Notwithstanding the third of the above findings, the team examined whether UNFICYP could be replaced by a peace-keeping operation modelled on either the former United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) or the

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights in the Syrian Arab Republic. 4/ The team came to the conclusion that neither of those options was viable from the operational point of view in the conditions obtaining in Cyprus.

47. In any case, an operation based wholly or partly on military observers would cost the United Nations more than the existing infantry-based force. This is because the cost of paying mission subsistence allowance to the military observers (the standard financial arrangement for such personnel) would exceed the cost to the United Nations of the infantry personnel whom the observers would replace. (The estimated annual cost to the United Nations of military observers deployed to Cyprus under existing financial arrangements would be over $30,000 each.) Moreover, mission subsistence allowance would obviously have to be paid on time, whereas the United Nations is at present 10 years late in reimbursing troop costs to the contributing Governments. In addition to its operational inadequacies, the military observer option would thus not be viable financially unless it is assumed that the Security Council would accept an increase in the cost of the Force and a move to financing by assessed contributions.

48. My predecessor proposed an alternative solution namely to reduce UNFICYP from the four existing battalions to three slightly larger battalions. With the cooperation of the troop-contributing Governments, this would have produced savings of 30 per cent without cutting the number of troops on the line. This option would, however, have required a change to assessed funding, which did not enjoy the necessary support in the Council. I still think that it is the best option available.

49. Now that the question has been brought to a head, for entirely understandable reasons, by some of the troop-contributing Governments, there are broadly two ways in which the Council could proceed. One would be to retain the existing mandate and accept the risks of trying to execute it with fewer troops. The second would be to tailor the mandate to one that could be executed by the number of troops deemed likely to be available under the present financial arrangements. In either case, the Security Council would need to assure itself that there was a reasonable prospect of stability for the next few years, in order to avoid either gradual attrition of the Force or repeated changes in its mandate as a result of decisions by the troop-contributing Governments. Detailed consultations with the latter would thus be necessary before recommendations were submitted to the Security Council.

50. Either option would involve risks, but the second would be the riskier. This is because it would involve abandoning the function which has enabled UNFICYP to keep the peace in Cyprus since 1974, namely control of the buffer zone. This is not a barren no man's land. It has a sizeable resident population and is the scene of agricultural and industrial activity of some importance. Without the presence of United Nations troops to supervise those activities and to ensure that there are no moves forward by the troops of either side, the danger of petty incidents escalating into armed conflict

would greatly increase. If it is assumed that for these reasons the Security Council would wish to maintain UNFICYP's existing mandate, the question to be examined is how that mandate could be executed with fewer troops.

51. In such circumstances, it would be essential that there should be the least possible reduction in the number of troops on the line. Contributing Governments that wished to maintain their participation with a reduced strength should be urged most strongly not to touch their line companies and to concentrate any cuts on their headquarters and support elements.

52. However, a better solution would be to change UNFICYP's structure, in order to improve the ratio of line to headquarters/support troops. For this reason, I share my predecessor's preference for a three-battalion structure. At present the four battalions (or equivalent units) deployed on the line in Cyprus have an average strength of less than 400 each. This is starkly less efficient than the large battalions that the United Nations has deployed in more recent peace-keeping operations (750-strong in Namibia, 850-strong in Cambodia, 900-strong in Croatia). The worst option, from the United Nations point of view, would thus be for all four Governments to reduce the size of their existing battalions further.

53. The least bad option, again from the United Nations point of view, would be for one of the existing contingents to withdraw completely with the others increasing their line strength or, if that is not possible, cutting some of their headquarters/support troops. The previous Force Commander, in his farewell visit to New York, told me that he believed that there was room for such savings, which could be used to maintain the present number of troops on the line, within a smaller Force.

54. Another possibility for improving the ratio of line troops would be for two or more contributing Governments to form a single, large, composite battalion with a mixed headquarters. This is a notoriously difficult concept, and preliminary soundings of the UNFICYP troop-contributing Governments have shown little enthusiasm for it. A less radical approach would be to find ways of sharing some administrative and logistics support functions among battalions in a way that would reduce overall the number of troops assigned to such functions.

55. If a reduction in UNFICYP's strength on the line becomes inevitable, the Force will need a rapid reinforcement capability to deal with any situation, which it is unable, with its reduced strength, to bring under control. The only practicable provider of such a capability would be the United Kingdom, using troops it has deployed for national purposes in the sovereign base areas in Cyprus.

56. The above discussion of possible options reflects United Nations priorities and preferences. These will not necessarily coincide with those of the troop-contributing Governments, which will be guided by their own political and military priorities. Consultations are, therefore, necessary in order to clarify with the troop-contributors their precise intentions about

continuing participation in UNFICYP, including the timing of any reduction or withdrawal of their contingents, and to explore with them the possibilities discussed in the present report. In this way it will be possible to define specific proposals for submission to the Security Council at the appropriate time.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

57. During the past six months UNFICYP continued to perform its important functions in an exemplary manner, sometimes under difficult circumstances.

58. I believe that the two communities could make better use of UNFICYP's ability to promote and facilitate greater contact between them. This useful function flows from the Force's mandate to promote a return to normal conditions on the island. It will continue to receive increased emphasis.

59. On my instructions, the authorities on both sides in Cyprus have been made aware of my concerns about the situation in Pyla and my view that the bicommunal nature of the village demands special cooperation and understanding by both sides. It is of fundamental importance that the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot village mukhtars be allowed to work together without outside interference so that they can exercise the full range of their responsibilities in village affairs. I therefore appeal to both sides to refrain from interfering in local activities in Pyla. UNFICYP will continue to fulfil its mandate to restore normal conditions by providing all possible assistance to effective cooperation between the two mukhtars. It will also continue to exercise actively its responsibility for resolving contested issues in the village by facilitating practical solutions based on strictly humanitarian criteria.

60. In the prevailing circumstances, I believe that the continued presence of the Force on the island remains indispensable to achieve the objectives set by the Security Council. I therefore recommend to the Council that it extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six-month period, that is until 15 December 1992, subject to possible changes in its size and mandate for which I might need to seek the Council's approval in the light of the consultations envisaged in paragraph 56 above. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this matter with the parties concerned and I will report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.

61. In making this recommendation, I must again stress that UNFICYP is facing a chronic and ever-deepening financial crisis, which imposes a most unfair burden on the troop-contributing countries. I fully share their Governments' concern at this situation. In his report of 15 October 1991 on the financing of UNFICYP, my predecessor formally reiterated his belief that the best way to finance UNFICYP on a more equitable basis would be for the United Nations share of the costs of the Force to be financed from assessed contributions. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 682 (1990) of

21 December 1990, the Secretariat cooperated actively with the Security Council in its deliberations on this issue and identified a new method of defining and rationalizing extra and extraordinary costs. Should the Council decide to move the Force to assessed contributions, the Governments concerned had agreed to reduce their claims by some 29 per cent. It is still my hope that the Council will decide to place UNFICYP on a sound and secure financial footing.

62. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support that they have continued to give this important peace-keeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to thank the Governments that have made voluntary contributions towards the financing of the Force.

63. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Oscar Camilion, to the Force Commander, Major-General Michael Minehane and his predecessor Major-General Clive Milner, and to the military and civilian personnel of UNFICYP, who have continued to discharge with efficiency and dedication the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

Notes

1/ S/23780.

2/ See Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1980, document S/14275 and footnote 57.

3/ See ibid., Thirty-eighth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1983, document S/15812, para. 14.

4/ S/23263.

5/ S/18880, para. 28.

6/ See Official Records of the Security Council, Fortieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1985, document S/17657, para. 19.

7/ S/21982, paras. 54-59.

8/ S/23144.


قبرص • 塞浦路斯 • CYPRUS • CHYPRE • КИПР • CHIPRE
حدود مقاطعة
区界
District boundary
Limite de district
Граница округов
Limite de distrito
مطار ، مهبط
机场，简易机场
Airfield, airstrip
Aéroport, terrain d'atterrissage
Аэродром, взлётно-посадочная полоса
Aeropuerto, pista de aterrizaje
HQ UNFICYP
HQ UNCIVPOL
HQ BRITCON
HQ CANCON
Force Scout Car Sqn (-)
UN HP Coy (-)
UNFICYP Support Regt
Engineer Det
Signal Sqn
Army Air Corps Flight
Transport Sqn
Ordnance Det
Reme Workshop
Medical Centre
Canadian Logistic Coy
HQ SECTOR 2 (BRITCON)
HQ Coy (-)
One Coy
One Engr Tp
HQ SECTOR 1 (DANCON)
HQ & SP Coy
One Engr Sect
One Coy
Two Recce Sects
One Ferret Tp
MP Det
One Coy
SECTOR 2
One Pl
One Coy (-)
SECTOR 1
UNCIVPOL Stn
SECTOR 3
One Coy
HQ SECTOR 4 (AUSCON)
HQ Coy
UNCIVPOL Stn
MP Det
One Pl
Ferret Tp
Coy (-)
One Pl
SECTOR 4
MP Det
UNCIVPOL Stn
One Pl
UNCIVPOL Stn
MP Det
Liaison Post
One Pl
One Coy (-)
Ferret Tp
HQ SECTOR 3 (CANCON)
HQ Coy
One Coy
Recce Pl
UNCIVPOL Stn
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
KYRENIA
NICOSIA
FAMAGUSTA
LARNACA
LIMASSOL
PAPHOS
وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلم في قبرص في أيار/مايو ١٩٩٢
一九九二年五月联塞部队的部署
UNFICYP DEPLOYMENT AS OF MAY 1992
DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP AU MOIS DE MAI 1992
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНК НА МАЙ 1992
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP EN MAYO DE 1992
خطوط وقف اطلاق النار للقوات التركية
土耳其部队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Turkish Forces
Lignes du cessez-le-feu des forces turques
Линия прекращения огня турецких войск
Líneas de cesación del fuego de las fuerzas turcas
خطوط وقف اطلاق النار للحرس الوطني القبرصي
塞浦路斯国民警卫队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Cyprus National Guard
Lignes du cessez-le-feu de la garde nationale chypriote
Линия прекращения огня Национальной гвардии Кипра
Líneas de cesación del fuego de la Guardia Nacional de Chipre
حدود عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلم في قبرص
联塞部队行动分界线
UNFICYP operational boundaries
Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНК
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza
MAP NO. 2930 REV. 30 UNITED NATIONS
MAY 1992